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RETIRING THE "DEADLIEST ENEMIES" MODEL OF
TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS
Matthew L.M. Fletcher*
[Indian communities] owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no
protection. Because of the local illfeeling, the people of the States where they are found
are often their deadliest enemies.
-Justice Miller, United States v. Kagama
1
At the same time, because their means of subsistence had fallen prey to westward
expansion, reservation Indians were almost entirely dependent upon the federal
government for food, clothing, and protection, and were often 'dead[ly] enemies' of the
States.
-John G. Roberts et al., Brief for Petitioner, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government2
I. INTRODUCTION
The "deadliest enemies" motif is the foundation of the current model of tribal-state
relations, or what I will call the "deadliest enemies model" of tribal-state relations. 3 It
derives from an age-old, intergenerational enmity between the people of Indian
communities and the non-Indians who live on or near Indian Country. This model of
relations arose out of the often violent conflict over limited resources between Indians
and non-Indians during the westward migration of the American nation in the 19th and
early 20th centuries. Justice Miller used this language in United States v. Kagama as a
means to offer a policy justification for the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian Country.4 In this context, because Indians were so weakened and
* Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Juris Doctor, University of Michigan
Law School. Enrolled Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. Thanks to Bob
Clinton, Sam Deloria, Rob Gips, and John Wernet, whose lively roundtable discussion at the 32nd Annual
Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference inspired this paper.
1. 118 U.S. 375, 384(1886).
2. Br. for Petr. at 4, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govt., 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (brackets in
original) (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384).
3. As Sam Deloria noted at the 2007 FBA conference, "trust" is no more relevant in this context than it is
when tribes enter into commercial agreements with banks or in any arms-length negotiation.
4. 118 U.S. at 384 ("The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among
whom they dwell.") (upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, Act of Congress, March 3, 1885,
§ 9). See generally Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L.
Rev. 779 (2006).
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dependent on the federal government-and because the local non-Indians and the states
were so overwhelmingly hostile to tribal interests-federal legislation to extend federal
criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country was necessary to protect tribal communities.
Now-Chief Justice Roberts, representing the State of Alaska in a case in the late 1990s,
utilized the same phrasing in asserting that Indians on the continental United States were
just as deadly to the states and their citizens. 5 This model of mutual animosity forms the
backbone of tribal-state relations to this day. In general, state laws and regulations do
not have effect inside of Indian Country absent Congressional authorization.
6
But American Indian law is transforming. The political relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes remains, 7 but a new and more dynamic relationship
between states and Indian tribes is growing. States and Indian tribes are beginning to
smooth over the rough edges of federal Indian law-jurisdictional confusion, historical
animosity between states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns for tax
revenue, economic development opportunities, and regulatory authority-through
cooperative agreements. 8 In effect, a new political relationship is springing up all over
the nation between states, local units of government, and Indian tribes. One template for
these new arrangements is the Class III compacting process created in the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act.9 As a result of the relative success of the cooperation between gaming
tribes and states, tribal-state cooperation and agreement is growing. 10 Many states now
recognize Indian tribes as de facto political sovereigns, often in the form of a statement
of policy whereby the state agrees to engage Indian tribes in a government-to-
government relationship mirroring federal policy. The tribal-federal political
relationship remains, but more and more tribal-state political relationships form every
year, requiring an alternative legal theory authorizing federal and state legislation toward
Indian tribes. The federal common law still offers a threat to these new relationships by
keeping the authority of tribes and states to interact in a legal gray area.ll
This Essay argues two points. First, Indian tribes and states must move away from
the "deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations. Second, state action that involves
5. See Br. for Petr. at 4, Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govt., 522 U.S. 520 (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S.
at 384).
6. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 6.01[2], 501 (Lexis 2005) [hereinafter Cohen's Handbook]
(quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945)).
7. See generally Cohen's Handbook, supra n. 6, at §§ 5.04[31-[4] (describing the treaty and trust
relationship of the United States to Indian tribes); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the
Political Status oflndian Tribes, 82 St. John's L. Rev. 153 (2008).
8. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 Fed. Law.
38, 38 (2006).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
10. See e.g. John Petoskey, Address, Intergovernmental Agreements: Exercising the Government-to-
Government Relationship (31st Annual Fed. Bar Assn. Indian Law Conf., Apr. 6-7, 2006) (describing the
various intergovernmental agreements executed by the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
and local units of government); Br. for Non-Federal Appellees at 10-12, Taxpayers of Mich. against Casinos v.
Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians used the
relationships built through the gaming compact to successfully negotiate cross-deputization agreements with
neighboring jurisdictions).
11. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Philip S. Deloria & Robert Gips, Address, Tribal-State Cooperation
and Agreement: Foundational Principles/Legal Basis for Cooperative Agreements (32nd Annual Fed. Bar
Assn. Indian Law Conf., Apr. 20, 2007).
[Vol. 43:73
HeinOnline  -- 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 74 2007-2008
RETIRING THE "DEADLIEST ENEMIES" MODEL
or even favors Indian tribes and Indian people is constitutionally viable under federal
common law, so long as it does not discriminate against tribal interests.
II. THE TRIBAL-FEDERAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
The Constitution deals with Indian tribes in two places. First, the Indian
Commerce Clause provides that Congress holds exclusive authority to deal with Indian
commerce, preempting state authority in the area. 12 Indians also are mentioned in the
"Indians Not Taxed" Clause, whereby Indians who are not citizens cannot be counted for
purposes of political apportionment. 13  The way these two provisions should be
understood is to realize that the Founders accepted two different kinds of Indian tribes.
The first kind of tribe was located outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.
The second kind of tribe was exterminated or abandoned, no longer recognized as a
distinct political entity. The Indian Commerce Clause and the "Indians Not Taxed"
Clause applied to the first kind of Indian tribes. Indians who could be "taxed" applied to
the second kind. Hence, the President continued to negotiate treaties with Indian tribes
and Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 14 prohibiting anyone (including
states) from interfering in Indian affairs. Assimilated Indians who abandoned their tribal
relations could become citizens (in theory). 15
But there was a third kind of tribe that the Founders did not incorporate into the
Constitutional structure-and that is the only kind of tribe there is in the modem era-
Indian tribes located within the exterior boundaries of the United States. There are more
than 560 federally recognized tribes located within the United States. 16 Of course, the
Founders were aware of these tribes. In some instances, they even promised statehood to
them via the treaty process. 1 7 And in Worcester v. Georgia,18 Chief Justice Marshall
12. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States
to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from
the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been divested of
virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.
Id.; Co. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. St., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985); Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497
F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1307-08
(W.D.N.Y. 1983); Mohegan Tribe v. St. of Conn., 528 F. Supp. 1359, 1368-69 (D. Conn. 1982) (quoting Natl.
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)); Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography
107-08 (Random House 2005).
13. See generally George Beck, The Fourteenth Amendment as Related to Tribal Indians: Section 1,
"Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof' and Section 11, "Excluding Indians Not Taxed", 28 Am. Indian Culture &
Research J. 37, 40 (2004).
14. See generally Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade
and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834 (U. Nebraska Press 1962).
15. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1865).
But [Indians] may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized
by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States; and if an
individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he
would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other
foreign people.
Id.
16. See 72 Fed. Reg. 13647, 13648-13652 (Mar. 22, 2007) (Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to
Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs).
17. See Treaty with the Delawares art. VI, (Sept. 17, 1778), 7 Stat. 13.
2007]
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proclaimed the Cherokee Nation, located within the State of Georgia, an example of an
Indian tribe that was a "distinct, independent political [entity]." 19 Despite these realities,
the Constitution cannot be read as incorporating these tribes into the federalism structure.
But, despite the Constitution's infirmities as to these kinds of Indian tribes, these tribes
do exist as political sovereigns. In this sense, Indian tribes do stand outside the
Constitutional structure, though they are located geographically within the United States.
And, in this sense, Indian tribes are a political and legal anomaly, what Justice Kennedy
calls "extraconstitutional."
20
Under this constitutional regime, the federal government has taken on certain
responsibilities to Indian tribes under the treaty process. The United States is obligated
to protect Indian lands from being confiscated by others (including states and local units
of government). 2 1  The United States is obligated to recognize and preserve tribal
hunting, fishing, and other usufructuary rights. 22 As a matter of treaty and statutory law,
the federal government also has taken on the responsibility to maintain certain trust
properties owned by Indian people and Indian tribes and to provide specialized
government services to Indian people, including without limitation health, welfare, and
education. 23  The United States has taken on the responsibility to restore tribal
governments and government structures by supporting tribal government programs and
tribal economic development. 24 This is a snapshot of the political relationship between
Indian tribes and the federal government-the "trust relationship." It is this trust
relationship that serves as a proxy for the incorporation of Indian tribes into the dual-
federalism constitutional structure.
25
III. THE HISTORICAL EXCLUSION OF STATES
The federal government's current political relationship to Indian tribes could be
characterized as almost an accident of history. One of the very serious problems of the
Articles of Confederation was that it did not exclude state interference in Indian affairs.
26
18. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
19. Id. at 519.
20. US. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 213 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
21. See e.g. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
22. E.g. U.S. v. Mich., 471 F. Supp. 192, 257 (W.D. Mich. 1979); U.S. v. Wash., 384 F. Supp. 312, 401
(W.D. Wash. 1974).
23. See generally e.g. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 to 458bbb-2 (2002) (regulating Indian self-determination and
education assistance); 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4243 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (regulating Native American housing
assistance and self-determination).
24. See generally e.g. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (regulating protection of Indians and
conservation of resources); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000) (regulating Indian gaming).
25. See generally Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship between the
United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. Toledo L. Rev. 617
(1994); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within "Our Federalism": Beyond the
Dependency Paradigm, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 667 (2006); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Dualism and the Dialogic of
Incorporation in Federal Indian Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 28 (2005); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The
Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and
Integration, 8 Tex. Forum Civ. Libs. & Civ. Rights 1 (2003).
26. James Madison, The Federalist No. 42, in The Federalist 279, 284 (Jacob F. Cooke ed., Wesleyan U.
Press 1961).
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations
[Vol. 43:73
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The Framers of the Constitution wanted to correct that defect by excluding states (and
individuals) from dealing with Indian tribes and Indian people.27 While in hindsight the
Indian Commerce Clause appears to fail in this regard (given its plain language), 2 8 it is
clear that the Founders understood the Clause and the structure of the Constitution as a
whole to strip states and individuals of the authority to deal in Indian affairs. 29 The first
Congress' enactment of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, prohibiting all forms of trade
and interaction between Indians and others without federal consent, is strong evidence of
the intent to keep states away from Indian tribes.
30
Much of the early history of federal Indian law and policy is framed by the
designation of states as the "deadliest enemies" of Indians and Indian tribes. States and
their constituents were in a never-ending quest to take Indian lands and resources and, in
some circumstances, to eliminate Indians and Indian tribes.3 1 The State of Georgia's
legal and political assault on the Cherokee Nation in the 1820s and 1830s is indicative of
the strength of vicious political will used by states attempting to rid themselves of the
"Indian Problem." 32 The eastern states continued to acquire Indian lands long after the
congressional ban and began to pay the legal price almost two centuries later.33 Other
states and local units of government, with the acquiescence and sometimes assistance of
in the articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power
is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the
legislative right of any State within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed
members of a State, is not yet settled; and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention
in the Federal Councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet
residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far
intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.
Id.
27. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 62.
If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States
to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from
the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been divested of
virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.
Id.
28. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 146
(2001); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069, 1087-90 (2004); see also
Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 Ark.
L. Rev. 1149, 1167 (2003) ("One might expect that the Indian commerce subpart would be read in a similar
manner as its counterparts."); id. at 1168 (noting that the Court's Indian Commerce Clause jurisprudence has
only been established by "judicial fiat"); Cf Lara, 541 U.S. at 215, 224 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing U.S. v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); id. at 584-93 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
29. See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113,
118-34 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, No Federal]; Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause,
27 Conn. L. Rev. 1055, 1059-63 (1994).
30. See25U.S.C.§ 177.
31. See generally Andrea Smith, Conquest. Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide 36 (South End
Press 2005) ("Carl Schurz, a former Commissioner on Indian Affairs, concluded that Native peoples had 'this
stem alternative: extermination or civilization."').
32. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. Rev. 627, 639-47
(2006) (describing the circumstances leading to Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1 (1831) and Worcester, 31
U.S. 515, the so-called "Cherokee cases").
33. See generally e.g. Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716 (2000 & Supp.
2002); Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1724 (2000 & Supp. 2002); Connecticut
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760 (2000); Co. of Oneida, 470 U.S. 226.
2007]
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federal officials, took every action conceivable to force Indian people to leave. 34 The
disputes between tribes and states-and more specifically, tribes and state citizens-
could be deadly in a literal sense. State and local governments on or near Indian Country
have long histories of using apparent legal authority and simple force to dispossess
Indian people of land and property. 35 On numerous occasions, the use of simple force
has exploded into the use of deadly force-in short, the mass murder of Indian people in
states like Massachusetts, Colorado, and California.36  In the early half of the 20th
century, states continued to utilize their taxing and police powers to exploit Indians and
Indian tribes.
37
Until recent years, tribal and state interests competed in a vigorous (and often
vicious) zero-sum game of civil regulation, taxation, and criminal jurisdiction. The
states, having the benefit of constitutional sanction, have tended to have the upper hand
in most instances,38 but the federal judiciary has recognized enough exclusive federal
and tribal authority in Indian Country to create a common law presumption (however
weak) that state laws have no force in Indian Country.39 Some states continue to pursue
these kinds of legal and political warfare with Indian tribes.
40
The notion that states and tribes and their peoples are deadly enemies originates
from an assumption held by the Framers of the Constitution. It appears the Framers
believed several things about Indian affairs, some of which indicated a tenuous grasp of
34. See generally Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier
(Belknap Press 2005).
35. E.g. Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 Tulsa L.
Rev. 21, 24-28 (2005) (describing the so-called "Burt Lake Burnout," the destruction of an Indian village in
northern Michigan).
36. See Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars 1865-1890 xxi-xxii (Peter Cozzens ed., Stackpole Bks. 2005);
Keith Jennison & John Tebbel, The American Indian Wars 24 (Phoenix Press 2001); Jake Page, In the Hands
of the Great Spirit: The 20,000 Year History ofAmerican Indians 277-78 (Free Press 2003).
37. E.g. James A. Clifton et al., People of the Three Fires: The Ottawa, Potawatomi and Ojibway of
Michigan 34 (Michigan Indian Press 1986); James M. McClurken, A Visual Culture History of the Little
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Gah-Baeh-Jhagwah-Buk: The Way it Happened 79 (Michigan St. U. Museum
1991) (describing the policy of Emmett County, Michigan, officials in taxing Odawa Indians until they lost
their lands).
38. See generally Frank Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows: The Missing Narrative in Indian Law, 80
N.D. L. Rev. 743 (2004).
39. E.g. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959).
40. See e.g. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 131 (2005) (Ginsburg & Kennedy,
JJ., dissenting).
In sum, the Nation operates the Nation Station in order to provide a service for patrons at its casino
without, in any way, seeking to attract bargain hunters on the lookout for cheap gas. Kansas'
collection of its tax on fuel destined for the Nation Station will effectively nullify the Nation's tax,
which funds critical reservation road-building programs, endeavors not aided by state funds. I resist
that unbalanced judgment.
Id; Br. for Respt. at 2, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95.
The state tax thus interferes directly with a core attribute of tribal sovereignty--the Tribe's power to
impose a fuel tax to finance the construction and maintenance of reservation roads and bridges. The
State's studied ignorance of the Tribe's sovereign interest in taxation to support its infrastructure is
ironic at best, as the power to tax is the very attribute of its own sovereignty that the State purports
to vindicate. Despite the State's contentions, this case is not about economic advantage, but about
how to accommodate the competing interests of two legitimate sovereigns. The State's solution is
to deny the Tribe's interest in its entirety.
Id. (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 43:73
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reality. First, the Framers likely assumed that Indian tribes and, to a lesser extent, Indian
people were not long for North America. 4 1  The disappearance of Indian tribes and
people was both hoped for and legislated for by the United States Congress for over 150
years. 42  Of course, it did not happen. Second, the Framers assumed that the States
would attempt to control Indian tribes and people as a means of taking those resources
controlled by tribal interests. 43 At the time of the Founding, the first point of order for
most state governments was to acquire and control the resources to the west, that is,
Indian Country. 44 Third, over all the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention and
even into the first few decades of the United States under the Constitution, the leaders of
the United States feared the unification, organization, and potential hostility of Indian
tribal militaries that, if it came to pass, would be a true threat to the nascent American
government. 45 And, even without an Indian military alliance, the Framers assumed that
Indian tribes and people were, on average, brutal, savage killers, feared by the American
populace. 46 Fourth, the Framers assumed that the means to best push back the Indian
presence in the continent was through trade and agriculture, not military force.
4 7
Finally, the Framers assumed that the federal government must have control of Indian
affairs in order to limit tribal-state relations that would both create violent conflict and
eliminate a potential source of federal revenue and political power in the early
Republic. 48 The First Congress' Trade and Intercourse Act and its subsequent versions
personify the understanding of the Framers and the earliest American leaders that the
41. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 Tulane L. Rev. 510, 556-60 (2007);
see also Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 217, 280 (2003); Arthur S. Miller, Myth and Reality in American Constitutionalism, 63
Tex. L. Rev. 181, 201 (1984) ("The founders wrote that 'all men are created equal,' but they did not believe
their own rhetoric; they were the same men who began the systematic genocide of native Americans ... ").
42. See generally Christine Bolt, American Indian Policy and Reform: Case Studies of the Campaign to
Assimilate the American Indians (Unwin Hyman 1987).
43. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 405, 447-53
(2003).
44. See Fletcher, supra n. 41, at 550-53.
45. Id. at 545-50.
46. See Andrew McFarland Davis, The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries in the American War, 2 English
Historical Rev. 709, 722-26 (1887).
47. See Thomas Jefferson, President Jefferson on the Indian Trading Houses, in Documents of United
States Indian Policy 21, 21-23 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed., U. Nebraska Press 2000); Robert W.
McCluggage, The Senate and Indian Land Titles, 1800-1825, 1 W. Historical Q. 415, 415-16 (1970) (quoting
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson).
48. Cf Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 586 (1823).
The States, having within their chartered limits different portions of territory covered by Indians,
ceded that territory, generally, to the United States, on conditions expressed in their deeds of
cession, which demonstrate the opinion, that they ceded the soil as well as jurisdiction, and that in
doing so, they granted a productive fund to the government of the Union. The lands in controversy
lay within the chartered limits of Virginia, and were ceded with the whole country northwest of the
river Ohio. This grant contained reservations and stipulations, which could only be made by the
owners of the soil; and concluded with a stipulation, that "all the lands in the ceded territory, not
reserved, should be considered as a common fund, for the use and benefit of such of the United
States as have become, or shall become, members of the confederation," &c. "according to their
usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona
fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever."
Id. (emphasis added).
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 79 2007-2008
TULSA LA W REVIEW
federal government would deal with Indian tribes and people, first, as trade partners and,
second, as military threats.4 9 The states and their citizens would be required to follow
the lead of the United States.
And this state of affairs is exactly the state of affairs that exists between Indian
tribes, the United States, and the states in the modem era. But consider that most of the
five major assumptions made by the Framers in 1787 and beyond have not aged well.
Indian tribes and Indian people are as strong and capable as they ever have been since
shortly after Contact. States no longer possess the stated desire or policy of acquiring as
a means of expansion the land and property of persons or entities outside of their
borders. Indian tribes and Indian people no longer possess military might or the interest
in physically fighting American citizens. In fact, Indian people are American citizens. 50
As such, the potential for literal violence between the states and the tribes is relatively
low. The lone assumption of the five that retains a significant value is the assumption
that the best way to deal with Indian tribes is through trade. However, though much of
federal Indian policy does focus on economic development,5 1 much more of modem
federal Indian policy is focused (properly) on the development of Indian tribes as viable
and stable political entities.52  The United States is no longer actively seeking to
assimilate Indian people through the erosion of their governments and cultures as a
matter of national policy. That policy already failed.
Given the incorrectness of the Framers' assumptions about Indian affairs, the
"deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations makes no sense. And, like large
portions of the rest of the Constitution, the Constitution's treatment of Indian tribes and
Indian people has not aged very well at all. The Framers' original intent as it relates to
Indian tribes is so far removed from modem reality that it would be laughable if the
history connecting the Framers to the modem world were not so tragic and horrifying.
What makes this a problem for modem tribal-state relations is that the federal
common law that arose from the Constitution's limited treatment of Indian tribes and
Indian people has deviated from both the intent of the Framers and from the modem, on-
the-ground realities of Indian affairs. The Supreme Court 19th century view that Indian
tribes would soon disappear was replaced by a more enlightened, mid-20th century view
articulated in the original Handbook of Federal Indian Law that tribal sovereignty was
constitutionally viable and legitimate. 53 But in order to marry the two deviating courses
49. See Cohen's Handbook, supra n. 6, at 37-41.
50. See Pub. L. No. 68-175, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (1924); see generally Robert B. Porter, The Demise
of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American
Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 Harv. Blackltr. L.J. 107 (1999).
51. See e.g. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000) (authorizing Indian tribes to form federal corporations for economic
development purposes); id at §§ 2701-2721 (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
52. See e.g. id at § 476 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (authorizing Indian tribes to form constitutional
governments); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121,
141-44 (2006). Cf generally Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. Rev.
691, 719-25 (2004) (describing Congressional intent in enacting the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479).
53. See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1942).
Perhaps the most basic principle of federal Indian law.., is the principle that those powers which
are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts
of Congress, but are inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.
[Vol. 43:73
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(and to protect emerging but vulnerable tribal governments), Felix Cohen had to
highlight a bright-line rule that tribes and states could not mix. 54 This position had a
great deal of Constitutional weight behind it. The legislative history of the Indian
Commerce Clause, with its origins in the failed, miserable policy of the Articles of
Confederation, indicates with a significant clarity that the federal government would
drive Indian affairs to the exclusion of the states.55 Not even the Tenth Amendment
could restore state authority in Indian affairs.5 6 Chief Justice Marshall's articulation of
this rule in Worcester v. Georgia-that state law can have no force in Indian
Country57 -was a simple articulation of that original understanding.
And by the later decades of the 20th century, much of the explicit animus of states
toward Indians and Indian tribes has receded. American Indian law has stabilized the
relations between the states and Indian tribes, the federal government does just enough to
protect Indian tribes from state intervention, and there simply is not much more Indian
land and resources to acquire. 58  Modem American Indian law is more a legal and
political contest between Indian tribes and states over what is left-and what is left often
has links to Indian gaming. Tribes and states compete for jurisdictional, taxation, and
regulatory authority, with the old foundational principles of federal Indian law as a
"backdrop." 59  Some of these disputes can be ferocious, but few of them lead to
violence. In the modem era, it no longer appears to be the goal or policy of state
governments to eliminate Indian tribes and Indian people. The "Indian Problem" is now
political and legal.
IV. THE NEW TRIBAL-STATE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
Spurred by developments in national Indian policy and a few Supreme Court
decisions,6 1 states and tribes began to talk in earnest in the 1990s. There had been a few
cooperative agreements between Indian tribes and states as far back as the 1970s (and
perhaps earlier), 62 but these agreements were few and subject to changing political
winds, not to mention the old animus between the parties. A sort of legal stalemate
ensued in the 1990s between Indian tribes and states. A shorthand way to describe the
Id. (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 121 ("In matters involving only Indians on an Indian reservation, the state has no jurisdiction in
the absence of specific legislation by Congress.") (emphasis removed).
55. See also Clinton, No Federal, supra n. 29, at 130-32.
56. See Co. of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 234.
57. 31 U.S. at 540.
58. But cf Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites: Asserting a Place for Indians
as Non-Owners, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1061, 1135-38 (2005).
59. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Backer, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) ("[T]raditional notions of Indian self-
government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an important 'backdrop'
against which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.") (citation omitted).
60. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation
Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. Rev. 759, 799-800 (2004).
61. E.g. Okla. Tax Commn. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
62. See Br. for Amici Curiae Natl. Intertribal Tax Alliance et al. at 12 n. 8, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95; Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the Michigan Tribal-State Agreements, 82 U. Det.
Mercy L. Rev. 1, 4 n. 26 (listing tax agreements dating back to 1970).
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equation was that the tribes had casino gaming,63 treaty rights, 64 and all but exclusive
authority over tribal members in Indian Country,65 while the states had enough common
law authority over nonmembers inside of Indian Country to interfere with tribal affairs. 66
While in the 1960s and 1970s, Indian affairs litigation involved the question of whether
Indian tribes would survive as political entities in the United States (a question answered
roundly in the affirmative), 67 in the 1980s and 1990s, Indian affairs litigation involved
jurisdictional limits and smaller and smaller amounts of money. 68 The costs of litigation
began to overwhelm the stakes. In such circumstances, negotiation is the proper tool.
The foundational principle that excludes states from Indian affairs is no longer
necessary, nor is it viable. The political and social circumstances justifying exclusive
federal authority in Indian affairs have changed. States and their subdivisions (in
general) no longer act to destroy Indian tribes. And the federal government, in a slow
but deliberate fashion, is getting out of the Indian business. 69 Congress delegates more
and more of its exclusive Indian affairs authority to tribes and, to a lesser extent, states.
Two important modem statutes, the Indian Child Welfare Act70 and the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act,7 1 authorize and even mandate cooperation between Indian tribes and
states.
By the 1980s, many Indian tribes and states began to realize that the future of
tribal-state relations would be negotiation and agreement. 72 Many states now authorize
the negotiation and execution of cooperative agreements with Indian tribes. 73 Arizona
authorizes the Arizona State Boxing Commission to enter into intergovernmental
agreements with Indian tribes to provide for the regulation of boxing in Indian
Country; 74  California authorizes agreements to create economic development
opportunities with Indian tribes; 75 Minnesota authorizes the creation of tribal-state law
enforcement cooperative agreements; 76 and Nebraska authorizes its governor to
63. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721; Cal. v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
64. See Wash. v. Wash. St. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979); U.S. v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); U.S. v. Mich., 471 F. Supp. 192.
65. See Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
66. See Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. N.M, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
67. E.g. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
68. E.g. Okla. Tax Commn. v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); S.D. v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679
(1993); Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505; Kerr-Mcgee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); N.M. v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Wash. v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
69. Cf generally U.S. Commn. on Civ. Rights, A Quiet Crisis: Federal Funding and Unmet Needs in
Indian Country (July 2003) (available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage_
01/0000019b/80/1 b/60/21 .pdf).
70. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
71. Id.at§§2701-2721.
72. See generally U.S. Commn. on Tribal-State Relations, State-Tribal Agreements: A Comprehensive
Study (American Indian Law Center May 1981).
73. For broad surveys of these agreements, see American Indian Law Deskbook: Conference of Western
Attorneys General ch. 14, 500-31 (Clay Smith ed., 3rd. ed. 2004); Cohen's Handbook, supra n. 6, at § 6.05.
74. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 5-224(t) (West 2002).
75. Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 11019.8(a) (West 2005).
76. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.93(4) (West 2006).
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negotiate and execute tax agreements with Indian tribes located within the state. 77 States
such as Michigan, Montana, Oregon, and Wyoming authorized the government to enter
into all kinds of intergovernmental cooperative agreements with Indian tribes. 78 Most
states now recognize Indian tribes as legitimate governments by including them in
uniform codes and other regulatory statutes. Examples include Alabama's Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act79 and Utah's Native American Grave Protection and
Repatriation Act,80 although there are many others.
Perhaps most important to purposes of this Article, many states now require their
agencies to deal with Indian tribes on a "government to government" basis. These states
include Colorado, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. 8 1  Other states have administrative rules or
attorney general opinions recognizing the federal-tribal relationship and act accordingly,
for example, New Jersey and Nevada.
82
Not all states choose to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes over taxes or
jurisdiction or anything at all. Even some states that have authorized or instructed local
units of government to negotiate with Indian tribes have not acted in good faith. And, of
course, many Indian tribes continue to be reluctant to engage their neighbors in this
manner.
V. Is THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY TO STATE-TRIBAL POLITICAL
RELATIONSHIPS?
Assuming tribal-state relations continue to develop (and it is most likely they will
and in more ways than any one commentator can anticipate), one problem remains-
federal Indian law. One of the foundational principles of federal Indian law as
articulated in the original and most influential Handbook of Federal Indian Law is that
the states and the tribes may not mix without the express authority of Congress." This
is the legal doctrine underlying the "deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations.
This model takes the form of various federal statutes and their implementing regulations,
some treaty provisions, and federal common law, as discussed above.
The remnants of ancient federal Indian policy still codified in several places in the
United States Code imply that tribes and states have little or no authority to execute
77. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 66-741(1) (2004).
78. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 124.502(e) (West 1999); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 18-11-101 to 18-11-112
(2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 190.110(3) (2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-1-103 to 16-1-110 (2007); Mich. Op. Atty.
Gen. No. 7134, Mich. Register 10-2003 (June 15, 2003).
79. Ala. Code § 8-1A-2(16) (Lexis 2006).
80. Utah Code Ann. §§ 9-9-401 to 9-9-406 (Lexis 2000).
81. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-44-101 (West 2006); Mont. Code Ann. § 90-11-101(8) (2005); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 6-28-1(E) (Lexis 2006); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 71A-8 (Lexis 2005); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68 § 500.63(A)(4)
(recognizing "sovereign power" of Indian tribes); Or. Rev. Stat. § 182.162 to 182.168 (2005); Wash. Admin.
Code § 458-20-192(1)(d) (2007); Mich. Exec. Directive No. 2004-5(11) (May 12, 2004); Or. Exec. Order No.
EO-96-30 (May 22, 1996) (available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/govtogov/eo96-30.pdf); Wis. Exec.
Order No. 39 (Feb. 27, 2004) (available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/wi-Sovereignty_
executive order.pdf).
82. Nev. Admin. Code § 702.300(2)-(3) (2007); N.J. Admin. Code 10:1 10-1A.1 (2007) ("Indian tribe").
83. See Cohen, supra n. 53, at 121 ("In matters involving only Indians on an Indian reservation, the state
has no jurisdiction in the absence of specific legislation by Congress.").
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 83 2007-2008
TULSA LA W REVIEW
intergovernmental agreements. The Trade and Intercourse Act as amended and finally
granted permanence by Congress in 1834 may stand as an implied political barrier to
tribal-state relations. 84 Other provisions limiting tribal authority to alienate or mortgage
lands or refusing to recognize external tribal sovereignty tend to imply a lack of tribal
authority to execute intergovernmental agreements with states. 85  However, another
critical Indian law statute, known as Section 81, has been amended in recent years to
create additional (and perhaps sufficient) capacity for tribes to negotiate and execute a
wide variety of agreements, even agreements that allow for the collateralization of Indian
trust lands for a limited period of years.86
In addition to statutory implications, the federal common law recognizes barriers to
tribal-state cooperation as well. The Supreme Court's decision in Kennerly v. District
Court 87 held that tribes could not divest themselves of the entirety of their jurisdiction to
states without the express consent of Congress.88  In the case of modem
intergovernmental agreements, Indian tribes are not conceding jurisdiction over their
entire territories to states-they are settling questions of jurisdictional dispute with the
states by creating certainty through agreement where federal Indian law offers nothing
more than gray areas.8 9  In the case of the Michigan tribal-state tax agreements, the
signatory tribes actually extended their jurisdiction outside of the reservation boundaries
to include benefits for tribal members living in Traverse City, Charlevoix, 9 1 or St.
Joseph.92  Moreover, a closer understanding of Kennerly's context confirms that its
underlying basis of the opinion was a concern that states were continuing to take
84. See25U.S.C. § 177.
85. Prior to 2000, for example, 25 U.S.C. § 81 read:
No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians, or individual Indians not
citizens of the United States, for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in
present or in prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other person
in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands, or to any claims growing out of,
or in reference to, annuities, installments, or other moneys, claims, demands, or thing, under laws or
treaties with the United States, or official acts of any officers thereof, or in any way connected with
or due from the United States ....
Id.
86. See Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-179,
§ 2, 114 Stat. 46, 46 (2000).
87. 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam).
88. See id. at 428-30 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1964 ed., Supp. V)).
89. E.g. Fletcher, supra n. 62, at 19-20.
90. See Tax Agreement between the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and the State
of Michigan app. A (May 27, 2004) (available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/GTBTaxAgreement
96417 7.pdf); see also Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians: Traverse City-Tax Agreement
Map (available at http://www.gtb.nsn.us/pdf files/tax%20maps/traverse city.pdf).
91. See Tax Agreement between the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and the State of Michigan
app. A (Dec. 20, 2002) (available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/LTBBAgreement_58762_7.pdf);
see also Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians: LTBB Tax Agreement Area Map (available at
http://www.ltbbodawa.org/Departments/GIS/pdf/ltbbtaxagreement.pdf; cf Hotel Room Tax, Waganakising
Odawa Tribal Code § 7.701-7.705 (2007) (available at http://www.ltbbodawa-nsn.gov/ltbb_V_2/TribalCode
/Tribal%20Code.pdf).
92. See Tax Agreement between the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians and the State of Michigan app. A(Dec. 20, 2002) (available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/PokagonBandTaxAgreement 85485_7.pdf);
see also Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians: Tribal Tax Revenue & Adminstr. Code (2003) (available at
http://www.pokagon.com/codes/TaxRevAdminCode071130.pdf).
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advantage of tribes, with the consent of tribal councils.
93
Easily the most cogent articulation of the reasons why tribal-state agreement could
be invalid absent congressional action as a constitutional matter is contained in
Professor Bob Clinton's recent article, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts'
Frustration of Tribal,-*Federal Cooperation.94  Professor Clinton's constitutional
warnings focus on the following issues:
" "[T]he Indian commerce clause of Article III, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
United States Constitution was clearly and demonstrably intended to eliminate
any claims of state authority to negotiate with Indian tribes or to manage
Indian affairs, even for tribes located within the borders of that state";
95
" "While not directly applicable, the interstate compact clause of Article I,
Section 10 the United States Constitution provides an instructive analogy.
While the plain language of that clause prohibits a state from 'enter[ing] into
any Agreement or Compact with another State,' the judicial interpretations of
the clause generally have limited its force to agreements which affect the
sovereignty, jurisdiction, territorial integrity, or borders of the state";
96
" "[S]tates would totally lack authority to negotiate issues commonly found in
most Indian gaming compacts without the authority afforded them by the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Agreement."
97
These are serious concerns not to be taken lightly, but they make and rely upon the same
assumptions about Indian affairs that the Founders did. As a result, these concerns can
be assuaged with a reconsideration of what federal Indian law means in the modem era.
The rub in the constitutional argument is this: "protect[ion of] federal supremacy in
the negotiation of Indian agreements affecting sovereignty .... ,9 But this begs the
question of what federal interests are at stake when a tribe and a state enter into an
agreement on jurisdiction or other question involving sovereignty. Recall that the federal
government's interests in 1789 were substantial (national security, national revenue
sources, and so on), but those interests have faded in this context. Remember further that
the plain text of the Indian Commerce Clause does not preclude tribal-state
agreements-and neither does any federal statute expressly prohibit these agreements.
The only way, then, that tribal-state intergovernmental agreements would be struck down
as violative of the Constitution would be as a matter of common law.99 In other words,
93. See Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 429 n. 5. Sen. Ervin of North Carolina, the principal author and sponsor of
the Indian Civil Rights Act, from which 25 U.S.C. § 1326 derived, was motivated in large part to assimilate
Indian people through the imposition of federal civil rights laws on Indian Country. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal)
Sovereignty and lliberalism, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 799, 809 (2007).
94. Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration of Tribal'--Federal
Cooperation, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 22-23 n. 54 (2004). I have already offered a short lawyerly response to
Professor Clinton's powerful argument. Fletcher, supra n. 60, at 772-73 n. 88. This Essay offers a somewhat
more theoretical response, however.
95. Clinton, supra n. 94, at 22 n. 54.
96. Id.; see also id (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452 (1978); Va. v. Tenn.,
148 U.S. 503 (1893)).
97. Clinton, supra n. 94, at 23 n. 54.
98. Id.
99. There have been two recent cases in which someone challenged a tribal-state tax agreement, but neither
decision reached the constitutional question. See Lamplot v. Heineman, 2006 WL 3454837 (D. Neb. Nov. 29,
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the very same case that articulated the "deadliest enemies" model of tribal-state relations
in the first instance-United States v. Kagamal°°-would be the centerpiece of the
common law assault on the authority of states (and to a lesser extent, tribes) to enter into
these agreements. Kagama's view of Indian tribes and the trust relationship between
tribes and the United States is no longer the reality of Indian affairs, if it ever was.
Indian tribes are heading in a direction toward self-governance, with their remaining
"dependence" on the federal government being more and more confined to international
relations and security from foreign threats.
A far better view-one that will replace the current form of the trust relationship-
is to view states as a legitimate player in Indian affairs. So long as the federal-tribal
political relationship is not interrupted or affected in a negative manner, what harm does
it do to legitimize tribal-state agreements? Relationships between states and tribes are no
longer based in violence and genocidal racism. Like any arms-length transaction
between commercial partners or sovereigns, modern state and tribal parties will use the
legal process to enforce rights and duties. Tribal-state agreements are exercises of
sovereignty-and nothing in the Constitution should preclude them.
VI. CONCLUSION
As co-chair of the 2006 Federal Bar Association's Annual Indian Law Conference,
I drafted a summary of the goals of that year's conference (with the assistance of Allie
Greenleaf Maldonado, Gabe Galanda, and Cheryl Fairbanks, the other co-chairs), a
conference we titled, "Active Sovereignty in the 21st Century." These words are very
appropriate in concluding this brief Essay:
Tribal leaders and advocates have long known, understood, and even memorized Felix
Cohen's classic statement of tribal sovereignty appearing on page 122 of the original
Handbook of Federal Indian Law. The powers vested in Indian tribes are inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty that has never been extinguished. In the early years of the 21st
century, after years of struggle to prevent further extinguishment of those powers, it is time
to move away from focusing on the "limits" of sovereignty and examine how Indian tribes
can activate those inherent, but often latent, powers that will expand and solidify tribal
sovereignty. Indians and Indian tribes live and learn in the real world, on the ground, and
in daily interactions with Indians and non-Indian community members; federal, state, and
local governments and government officials; and Indian and non-Indians businesses.
This conference invites tribal leaders and advocates to look inward and to strengthen the
core inherent sovereignty. We believe that a strong inner foundation will help build a
greater capacity to face opposition. 101
The title of that conference derived from Justice Breyer's recent book, Active
2006); Matheson v. Gregoire, 161 P.3d 186 (Wash. App. 2007).
100. 118U.S.375.
101. Active Sovereignty in the 21st Century: The 31st Annual Indian Law Conference, 53 Fed. Law. 34, 34-
35 (2006).
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Sovereignty.102 In his well-considered view, "The concept of active liberty ... refers to
a sharing of a nation's sovereign authority among its people. Sovereignty involves the
legitimacy of a governmental action."10 3 In a recent speech, Justice Breyer noted that
"the story of the American legal system needs to be told and retold ... because it 'floats
on the sea of public acceptance."'
10 4
All of these disparate quotations can be boiled down to the conclusion of this short
Essay as follows: Tribal sovereignty, like any governmental sovereignty, is not
automatically legitimate. Indian people have long fought for the right to govern
themselves as much as possible. And now that self-governance is a realistic possibility,
Indian people must now face another fight-legitimacy. Each time a state or local
government agrees to negotiate with an Indian tribe and then to execute a binding
agreement with an Indian tribe, that non-Indian government is recognizing the legitimacy
of the tribal government. Intergovernmental negotiation and agreement is an expression
of "active sovereignty"-and a means of earning governmental legitimacy. Tribes now
face questions from skeptical Supreme Court Justices 10 5 and others about the legitimacy
and future viability of tribal government. Retiring the "deadliest enemies" model of
tribal-state relations would be a powerful step in the right direction.
102. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (Alfred A. Knopf 2005).
103. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
104. Tony Mauro, Aging ABA Strives to Remain Relevant, Legal Times 12 (Aug. 20, 2007) (quoting Justice
Breyer).
105. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Legal Culture War against Tribal Law, 2
Intercultural Hum. Rights L. Rev. 93, 104-14 (2007).
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